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Abstract  
This article shows how both employers and the state have influenced macro-level processes and 
structures concerning the content and transposition of the European Union (EU) Employee 
Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive. It argues that the processes of regulation occupied by 
employers reinforce a voluntarism which marginalizes rather than shares decision-making power 
with workers. The contribution advances the conceptual lens of ‘regulatory space’ by building on 
Lukes’ multiple faces of power to better understand how employment regulation is determined 
across transnational, national and enterprise levels. The research proposes an integrated analytical 
framework on which ‘occupancy’ of regulatory space can be evaluated in comparative national 
contexts.  
Corresponding author: Tony Dundon, School of Business and Economics, National University of 
Ireland Galway, Ireland. Email: tony.dundon@nuigalway.ie  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The European Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive (2002/14/EC) was introduced to 
promote social dialogue and elements of shared decision-making. The Directive required member 
states to introduce permanent arrangements so managers would support dialogue at workplace 
level in three broad areas: i) provide ‘information’ pertaining to the economic situation of the 
company; ii) enable ‘information and consultation’ concerning developments or threats to 
employment; and iii), ‘inform and consult employees, with a view to reaching agreement’, on 
decisions likely to lead to changes in work organisation or contractual arrangements. One main 
disincentive in the UK and Irish context is that employees have to ‘trigger’ the right and request an 
information and consultation forum, which may actually discourage voice and participation 
(Wilkinson et al., 2007; Hall, 2010). There was a perception that the Directive was introduced with 
specifically the UK and Ireland in mind, given they were the only two EU member states at the time 
lacking generalized employee voice legislation (Hall et al., 2011). The research in this article 
addresses the policy determination and transposition of the I&C Directive within liberal market 
economies (LMEs). It asks what impact the Directive has had in encouraging employers to share 
decision-making powers with employees (unions) through new or revised consultation mechanisms. 
Existing evidence reports that the transposition of I&C regulations favour direct communications 
rather than collective systems of worker voice, as the original Directive proposed (Hall et al., 2011). 
The contribution in this article, however, is to show how actors dominated the regulatory space for 
I&C regulation by integrating 3 and linking both macro and micro contexts. The evidence illustrates 
how employer tactics for ‘neo-voluntarism’ and the politics of 'common knowledge formation’ 
(Culpepper, 2008) shaped the parameters on which statutory rights are formulated and enacted 
across different governance levels. In short, macro-level regulation reinforces, ironically, a micro-
level voluntarist dynamic by legitimising subjective meanings among social actors as objective fact. 
The I&C regulations did not prompt a new politic of common knowledge formation around shared 
social dialogue diffused from the macro policy to micro workplace level. The research further adds to 
knowledge by integrating Lukes three ‘faces’ of power (1974, 2005) to the concept of regulatory 
space. In so doing the article advances a multi-level, multi-dimensional analytical framework on 
which ‘occupancy’ of regulatory space can be evaluated in comparative national contexts. The article 
is structured as follows. Next, the concepts of ‘regulatory space’ and Lukes ‘faces of power’ are 
discussed, leading to a simplified schematic theoretical integration. Section three briefly informs the 
reader about the content of the I&C Directive and the issue of ‘light touch’ legalism. This is followed 
by an outline of the research methods. The evidence is presented in section five by integrating 
macrolevel data concerning employer and government responses to influence the ‘content’ and 
‘transposition’ of the I&C Directive. Subsequent linkages with micro-level evidence shows how 
Lukes’s faces of power translate to workplace practices reflecting I&C practices on the ground.  
 
Integrating ‘regulatory space’ and Lukes dimensions of power ‘Regulatory space’ has been advanced 
as an important analytical tool for assessing the impact of employment regulation (Crouch, 1985; 
Hancher and Moran, 1989; Martínez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004; Scott, 2001). Regulatory space can 
be defined as: ‘the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision. Proponents claim that its 
dimensions and occupants can be understood by examining regulation in any particular national 
setting, and by analyzing that setting in terms of its specific political, legal and cultural attributes’ 
(Berg et al., 2005:73). A number of theoretical issues are important. First, space, by definition, is 
open for occupation. The extent to which actors concerned with work and employment can occupy 
regulatory space heavily depends on their ability to mobilise resources and their capacity to prevent 
others from occupying the same resources (Edwards and Wajcman, 2005:118). To this end 
possession of positional power resources are central to processes of occupation (Lukes, 1974, 2005). 
Power resources connect to what MacKenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005) refer to as ‘shifting 
regulatory processes’. Thus employment actors seek to influence labour market outcomes by virtue 
of ‘positional power’, in which a sense (or discourse) of legitimacy is afforded to dominant groups to 
alter the rules of the game, rather than assuming some simple or overarching deregulatory 
trajectory based on government politics alone. Allen (2004) suggests that boundaries upon which 
regulation is contested at micro-level are shaped by multiple sources of influence at higher levels, 
stressing the interrelated connections across multiple levels of analysis. A second theoretical issue is 
that space can be unequally distributed, with actors mobilising resources to either advance or 
retreat their frontier of control (Goodrich, 1975). For example, employers and their representative 
associations are exemplars of institutions that colonize regulatory space for voice, while trade union 
power recedes (Hancher and Moran, 1989). Third, power resources influencing employment 
regulations can be institutionally conditioned, depending on national or enterprise level 
circumstances. The concept of regulatory space is therefore both multi-level and multi-dimensional, 
with vertical and horizontal governance factors shaping actor capacity to mobilise power resources 
to occupy space at different levels. MacKenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005) show that factors affecting 
change at one level, say the workplace, are better understood by assessing complex interactions 
across multiple spheres in which employment actors interact, for example across national and even 
transnational levels. Implications relate to, for example, union federations and employer 
associations potentially bypassing national (government level) institutions and lobbying EU policy-
makers directly (Allen, 2004). Fourth, employment actors may contest regulations or labour market 
rules in pursuit of their own ideological preferences (Edwards and Wajcman, 2005; Hancher and 
Moran, 1989). In assessing if the I&C Directive has led employers to involve employees (or unions) in 
decision-making relates also to the ideological preferences of managers to share or control power. 
This means that regulatory space is both a politicised and power-centred construct. The greater the 
space colonized by one employment actor, then the greater the probability of achieving desired 
preferences (Martinez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004). Viewing governance of work and employment in 
such multi-dimensional ways requires analyzing exchange of power between institutions and actors. 
In assessing the impact of the I&C Directive on whether employers share decision-making, 
unwrapping different layers of power is vital. Analysis of power, articulated by Lukes (1974, 2005), 
has an established pedigree in workplace sociology (Edwards and Scullion, 1982; Edwards, 2006; 
Sisson, 2012). Power, as it relates to work relations, is used in two ways at both macro and micro 
level. The first, ‘power to’, is a positivesum notion directed towards advancing common interests to 
get things done in a productive manner (Haugaard, 2012). Examples might be cooperative 
unionmanagement forums aimed at problem-solving, or managers devolving power to create 
workplace empowerment. In contrast, ‘power over’ is about domination and is a zero-sum game 
where one party wins what the other party loses. ‘Power over’ concerns the ability of one party to 
persuade another party to do something they would not otherwise do (Haugaard, 2012). Both 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’ infer the use and deployment of resources between key actors. For 
example, to obtain a wage employees have to labour under the directed rules and authority of an 
employer whom, typically, has greater access to resources than individual workers (Sisson, 
2012:177-183). Thus the employer’s ‘power over’ an employee usually means they can mobilize a 
greater range of resources to enforce a given preference, and hence the notion of regulatory space 
proves useful to conceptualise this as a zero-sum power approach. The result is that regulation of 
employment is typically unequal, with a structural inequity of resource allocation and distribution 
skewed in favour of employers. Table 1 advances a simple schematic to integrate Lukes (1974, 2005) 
three dimensional ‘faces’ of power with the concept of how employment actors can occupy 
regulatory space at macro and micro levels. Using Dahl’s (1961) organisational decision-making 
approach, Lukes’s first face of power is about observable domination and occurs when one party has 
the power to secure its aims over another. Open and transparent distributive bargaining is one 
notable example. However it is the other less obvious two faces of power which resonate to the 
tactics used to occupy regulatory space considered in this article. The second approach has its roots 
in Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) ‘non decisionmaking’ power, explaining how actors prevent certain 
issues being discussed in the first place, or prevent decisions about them being taken. An example is 
political lobbying by employers at a transnational level which can subsequently dilute employment 
legislation at lower (workplace) levels. Sisson (2012:186) illustrates this dimension of power by 
distinguishing two types of employee consultation: ‘decisionbased’ and ‘option-based’. With 
‘decision-based’ consultation management considers various options for restructuring, makes its 
preferred decision, and then consults employee representatives on how to proceed with a decision 
already made. With ‘option-based’ consultation management presents a range of restructuring 
options, and then employees (or their representatives) are invited to discuss alternative preferences 
with a view to reaching agreement. While management makes the final decision in both instances, 
employee representatives have more voice under ‘option-based’ consultation to influence 
employment regulation. The third face is ideological power. Although not without critique (Edwards, 
2006), this is the least observable and concerns the power to shape and manipulate peoples’ 
preferences. Lukes argues that ideological power was overarching and effectively shaped and placed 
constraints on the first and second faces of power. In employment, ideological power can ensure 
that employees accept or desire management-led practices that may be contrary to their own 
interests. Examples include various corporate culture or quality management initiatives that espouse 
the virtues of empowerment as a source of influencing employee attitudes to win their ‘hearts and 
minds’ (Willmott, 1993). Managerial claims about seeking to satisfy the so-called psychological 
contract for employees may be viewed as an ideological form of employer control and manipulation 
(Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). Sisson (2012:187) likens ideological power to Walton and McKenzie’s 
(1965) use of ‘attitudinal structuring’ during bargaining and consultation interactions. For example 
information and consultation are processes that influence employee expectations and outcomes. 
Communicative dialogue may be a source of power by limiting worker perceptions of what they 
might gain from management during a consultative or bargaining interaction. Thus by manipulating 
worker attitudes as to what may be legitimate or common knowledge, managers can promote 
communication channels as some sort of de facto consultative voice systems, implying a degree of 
powersharing that is in reality constrained. Beyond the workplace, a similar continuous discourse 
promulgated by many employers and politicians depicting the role of employment regulation as not 
interfering with management’s right to manage has gained ideological currency across neo-liberal 
economies, which similarly shapes attitudes and expectations at other socio-political levels of state 
regulation (McDonough and Dundon, 2010). By integrating faces of power with mechanisms that 
may be deployed to regulate employee voice, this research unpicks factors influencing both the 
determination and the transposition of the I&C Directive. In doing so, the research asks what impact 
the Directive may have had in encouraging employers to share decisionmaking powers with workers 
or their representatives to facilitate ‘power to’ and advance common interests. 3. Regulation of I&C: 
voluntarism and light touch labour law The ability of employment actors to mobilise ‘power to’ or 
‘power over’ employee voice depends on context. In particular, the legal setting is especially 
important for establishing parameters within which power is exercised by one party over another. 
Historically, governments have intervened to import a semblance of counter-veiling power in 
employment relations and, indeed, a prime purpose of legal regulation was protecting employees 
against laissez-faire capitalism and its power asymmetries. However, discourse about the purpose of 
such employment regulation has changed significantly (Dobbins, 2010). Growing emphasis on 
market liberalization and HRM practices has coincided with reassessment by the state (at EU and 
national level) of the purpose of legal regulation (Martinez-Lucio and MacKenzie, 2004). This 
reassessment of regulatory purpose can now be partly interpreted as a means of employer 
protection against collectively organized employees, rather than the other way round (Donaghey et 
al, 2011). EU-led regulations have gravitated from hard or protective laws (such as equal pay and 
health & safety) towards ‘softer’ light touch measures allowing member states greater latitude to 
transpose arrangements fitting national cultures (Gold, 2009; Hall et al., 2011). What distinguishes 
emerging EU social policy is its ‘low capacity to impose binding obligations on market participants, 
and the high degree to which it depends on various kinds of voluntarism ... in the name of self-
regulation’ (Streeck, 1995: 45-49). This has provided employers with greater latitude in shaping their 
‘preferred mode of intervention’ (Barnard and Deakin 2000: 341). Indeed, light touch regulation, 
combined with the unitarist advance of HRM, makes it easier for employers to shape practice and 
determine policy options for and on behalf of workers (Thompson, 2011). The impact of the 
transposed I&C Directive on employer decision-making powers remains an important and neglected 
issue. Both the UK and Irish governments transposed the Directive in a way that reflected variation 
in national custom (Hall et al., 2011). In Ireland, the overriding concern was to avoid legislation that 
favoured mandatory collective voice systems which might jeopardize inward investment from (non-
union) US multinationals (Lavelle et al., 2010). The ICE Regulations (2004) in the UK, effective in 
Northern Ireland in 2005, and the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act (2006) 
in Ireland broadly constitute light-touch mandates. The implication is that the state effectively 
favoured individualised arrangements over harder statutory provisions for collective representative 
participation that might have encouraged stronger power-sharing collaborations (Dundon et al, 
2006). Extant empirical evidence five years after the transposition of I&C regulations indicates that 
management dominate I&C provisions and control the agenda (Hall et al., 2011). The transposed 
regulations in both jurisdictions differ substantially from the Directive itself, in that direct 
(individualised) I&C is encouraged despite the Directive explicitly favouring indirect (collective) 
dialogue via ‘employee representatives’ (Donaghey et al 2012). The UK and Irish legislation is 
broadly, but not wholly, similar. In both countries employers need take no action unless 10% of their 
employees actively ‘trigger’ statutory procedures to request an information and consultation forum; 
in Ireland this is capped at 100 employees and 2500 in the UK. Even then, voluntary ‘pre-existing’ 
arrangements can continue if the employer can show employees (or unions) are agreeable. To this 
end, there is considerable scope for employers to establish organisation-specific I&C arrangements, 
including direct communication and non-union employee representative (NER) systems (Cullinane et 
al, 2012). In sum, the Directive’s transposition is fraught with contestation and lack of clarity 
between national level laws and intended European-wide regulations.  
4. Research Methods: Macro and Micro-Level Integration The rationale for data collection in both 
the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and Northern Ireland (UK) is important. The cases are comprised from 
multi-site organizations that operate I&C practices in sites covering both jurisdictions; thereby 
offering a comparative unit of analysis. The ROI and UK are similar open liberalized economies, 
although differ in some notable ways regarding employment regulation (Dundon and Collings, 2011). 
In Ireland there is an explicit reference to trade union involvement in  a new I&C forum where 
unions exist, which is not the same in the UK. However in ROI there is no statutory trade union 
recognition legislation, unlike the UK. The research approach integrates macro and micro level 
analysis across each jurisdiction, rather than looking at each separately. At the macro-level 127 
public documents were obtained using Freedom of Information (FoI) legislations: 122 obtained from 
the ROI government; 5 from the Employment Department in Northern Ireland, in addition to the UK 
tripartite agreement between the CBI, TUC and government concerning transposed ICE regulations. 
At micro-level, three qualitative workplace case studies were conducted at companies with 
operations in both jurisdictions. Taken together, this presents an integrated analysis of how 
employment regulation was shaped across transnational, national and local workplace spaces. The 
content analysis of documentary material involved a specific ex post facto procedure, following 
Cohen et al (2000:206). The first step was to acquire official documents about the I&C Directive and 
its policy determination. In ROI 149 documents were reported to be relevant by government 
officials. Of these, access to 122 was given: 43 were provided in full while 79 were partially granted 
with sections or words censored by civil servants. Access to 27 documents was refused. In the UK all 
5 submissions made to the Northern Ireland Employment Department, along with the 
aforementioned tripartite ICE agreement, were all scrutinised using content analysis. The second 
stage involved document coding according to key themes: for example articulated employer, union 
or government preferences. Attention was paidconcerning employer type: whether a multi-national 
or indigenous firm for example. The third step involved searching for local, national or transnational 
implications as a result of I&C policy preferences previously coded. Fourth, documents were 
searched for possible influences on the content of the I&C Directive along with articulated concerns 
about transposition issues according to actor type and jurisdiction. Finally, categories and sub-
categories indicating opposition or favouritism towards employment regulation were examined. 
Following the above, comparable micro level data collection and analysis examined the impact of 
I&C regulations at workplace level in three case studies. The cases also represented different sectors 
of economic activity: manufacturing (ConcreteCo), services (BritCo) and retail (RetailCo). The cross-
border, multi-sector approach provides scope for both ‘between’ and ‘within’ sector and 
jurisdictional comparisons. Further selection criterion was premised on achieving a mix of companies 
with union and non-union practices adopted or re-evaluated specifically because of the I&C 
Directive. A total of 64 interviews at 10 separate workplaces were completed over two years 
(summarized in Table 2).  
Findings 5a: I&C and Regulatory Space at Government Level:  
Macro-level evidence shows two related patterns of influence on occupancy of I&C regulations. The 
first relates to processes of politicised negotiation affecting content 14 of the I&C Directive, and the 
second concerns transposition issues relative to the national laws enacted in each jurisdiction. 
Activity influencing the content of the I&C Directive occurred in both jurisdictions. In the UK, and for 
the first time, a tripartite agreement was struck between the UK Government, CBI and the TUC 
concerning transposed regulations. Such an agreement is significant in its own right and relates to 
Lukes’s first face of power, evident through public and observable negotiation that led to the 
content of the ICE (2004) Regulations. In Ireland, however, political lobbying sought to limit the 
content of institutional regulation by influencing the agenda for I&C, reflecting Lukes’s second face 
of power. For example, evidence shows that civil servants held exclusive meetings with employer 
associations concerning the detail of the I&C Directive (e.g. Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation, IBEC; US Chamber of Commerce, AmCham; and the Irish Management Institute, IMI) 
(DETE 2001c,d; AmCham, 2001). IBEC sought to preserve non-statutory arrangements surrounding 
union recognition in ROI, expressing its concern that the Directive ‘may lead to trade union 
recognition by the back door’ (DETE undated). In a note circulated by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) (1998), governmental opposition to the I&C Directive at EU level was based on 
supporting business and foreign investment concerns: [The Directive would] …. restrict business in 
making the crucial and speedy decisions that are required in today’s competitive market; cut across 
the HRM practices of Irish operations of US multi-nationals and thus damage FDI (DFA, 1998) 
Overarching the second and into the third dimension of power, employer preferences articulated 
flexible market demands as important content elements in the Directive. This shows hegemonic 
values reified into market-driven behaviours at subsequent lower levels. For example, the US 
multinational company Intel met the relevant government Minister and DETE officials on several 
occasions to lobby for amendments to the I&C Directive, reflected in a document entitled ‘Elements 
of the Draft Directive which must be changed’. Intel summarized their distinct unitarist preferences 
as follows: The insistence of communicating and consulting with employee representatives rather 
than with employees fosters an opposition, ‘them versus us’ culture, which is the hallmark of the old 
and discredited conflict based industrial relations model …. requiring the nullifying of company 
decisions is a further draconian step which simply drives business to conclude that creating 
employment in the EU is to be avoided at all costs because the consequent risks far outweigh any 
benefits (Intel, 2000). Further politicised negotiation by the government sought to influence the 
content of the I&C Directive to reflect business interests. In a briefing note to the Minister for 
Enterprise Trade and Employment (DETE), it is observed that ‘during March/April we had secured 
key concessions’ prior to the enactment of the Directive at a Social Affairs Council meeting on 11th 
June 2001 (DETE, 2001b). Subsequent alterations of the I&C Directive evidently favoured employers 
and not workers or unions: The requirement for enterprises to report on the ‘probable economic 
and financial situation’ of the enterprise has been replaced by ‘probable economic situation’ only. 
This reduces the level of financial reporting obligations in the Directive. (DETE, 2001a) Relating to the 
second macro-level pattern, transposition of the regulations by government, the public consultation 
exercise allowed interested parties to offer their interpretation of how the I&C Directive should be 
transposed. Various employer bodies sought to protect small businesses by insisting that the 
regulations be restricted to organisations employing more than 50 staff (Hall et al., 2011). In 
addition, employees have to actively ‘trigger’ their rights; something that can be extremely risky for 
unorganised and non-union workers who might fear employer reprisals (Dundon and Gollan, 2007). 
In the UK employer groups such as the CBI and CIPD lobbied government to ensure their preferences 
were reflected in the transposed regulations (Hall, 2011). For example, while signing the agreement 
with the TUC, the CBI actively opposed the principle of ‘collective’ worker rights contained in the I&C 
Directive (CBI, 2003); in a manner akin to Lukes’s first observable public face of power. However a 
neglected aspect of power mobilisation in this regard is the role of informal dialogue in shaping 
attitudes, linking into the second face of power. In Ireland the DETE observed that it would ‘not help 
the partnership process’ if the extent of government and employer opposition to the Directive was 
publicly known (DETE, 1998), thereby seeking to obscure the ‘hidden’ level of collaboration 
(collusion) between the state and employer bodies, with unions excluded. In summary, in both 
jurisdictions employers appear to have gained by marginalising collective worker rights and 
ideologically legitimising direct communication as part of the I&C content and its transposed 
national-level regulation. Trade unions, meanwhile, vacated their ‘power to’ influence the space by 
viewing the issue with relative disinterest or uncertainty. Relative to unions employers have been 
strategically organised and pro-active in relation to: a) influencing content of the I&C Directive at EU 
level, and b), setting the agenda for transposition arrangements when enacted into national 
regulation. However, the extent to which this ‘power over’ regulatory space for I&C at the macro-
level has been diffused into workplace micro-level practices and preferences remains an empirical 
issue, which is reported next.  
5b: I&C and Regulatory Space at Firm Level The way worker voice was regulated in the three case 
organizations reflected variation in deployment of multiple power resources (see table 3). 
Importantly, processes of social formation concerning the I&C regulations at macro-level, as 
reported above, underpinned diffusion of knowledge and ideological assumptions at the micro-level 
that can be seen to be inter-subjective. That is to say many local managers assumed, as objective 
fact, that the I&C regulations promoted continuation of flexible information-sharing arrangements 
for voice because these attitudes were structured by employer associations and government at 
national and EU levels. Processes of common knowledge formation in each case and the linkage to 
power resources, where evident, are outlined next. BritCo: employees contest managerial 
occupation of voice in ROI Evidence from BritCo illustrates the importance of countervailing 
collective power which mediated employer occupation of I&C space at workplace level. A group of 
18 union members in the ROI mobilized to contest management’s preference for nonunion 
employee representation (NER) arrangements by instigating a union recognition campaign. BritCo 
has dual I&C arrangements that are union-based in NI and non-union in ROI. Management 
responded to the union organising campaign in ROI by re-constituting a previously defunct NER staff 
forum (BritCo Vocal). At the same time, BritCo Vocal was used to promote a new approach to 
employee representation because of the I&C Directive. As a result NER representatives were elected, 
the HR Director would outline company developments to Vocal representatives, followed by an 
economic update by the Chief Executive and meeting agendas publicly promoted employee 
concerns. In terms of the first observable face of power, NER representatives achieved some 
negotiated gains from management through the newly constituted Vocal forum, specifically 
concerning parity of redundancy terms. Reflecting the second dimension of power, the revamped 
arrangement did more than ‘comply’ with external I&C regulations: it also staved off a union 
recognition drive and embedded managerial preferences for nonunion I&C in ROI. In effect, BritCo 
management consciously sought occupation of regulatory space for voice by excluding unions and 
maximising non-union channels. However the recast Vocal forum was only partially successful. Many 
employee respondents felt the non-union forum degenerated into an ineffective ‘talking-shop’, 
more appropriate to ‘tea and toilet’ issues than substantive ‘option-based’ consultation with a view 
to reaching agreement. Significantly, once the union recognition drive subsided in ROI, the range of 
issues on which employees could engage with management waned and the desire among employees 
for union voice had not diminished: Some employees see it (non-union forum) as management 
paying lip service. Because we have no union, we have no power...There is a whole culture amongst 
employees that we should be unionised. (Employee Representative, ROI) At the same time, exercise 
of the first and third faces of power took place within an ideology of where management used direct 
communication and promoted unions as ‘external influences’, as a means of mobilising bias away 
from employee desire for union representation towards the in-house nonunion representation 
forum. Retail Co.: occupying regulatory space through culture and attitudinal manipulation RetailCo 
prides itself on being a ‘good’ non-union employer that supports its workforce through psychological 
engagement. The company does not recognise unions anywhere in Ireland or the UK and operates 
the same non-union I&C structures in both jurisdictions. The company offers an attractive 
employment package including above market pay rates and extensive training and employee 
engagement. The I&C centrepiece is known as ‘Bottom-Up’; an NER committee covering store, 
regional and divisional levels. To some extent RetailCo management would view power as a positive-
sum concept expressed through empowerment and inclusion, rather than domination or ‘power 
over’ employees. The overarching approach signifies a paternalistic-type culture by supporting 
individual employee engagement rather than collective union bargaining. For example: From its 
inception it has never been really explicit…we don’t deal with trade unions … We engage with 
employees and we operate a culture where we hope employees would not feel the need for joining 
unions (Manager). The processes by which management occupied regulatory space at RetailCo 
symbolises less transparent dimensions of Lukes’s second and third faces of power and combined 
both dominant and positive assumptions of power resource mobilisation - evident in its subtle if 
somewhat strategic union avoidance approach. The non-union employee committee, Bottom-Up, 
was revised in 2002 with a preference for I&C without union interference. The passing of the I&C 
Directive in the same year was a catalyst for management to review voice arrangements. However, 
desire to comply with external regulation was perhaps a less significant factor than management’s 
primary objective to support and engender positive employee attitudes that reflected a unitarist 
union-free culture. In revising I&C arrangements, each retail site has one representative for every 
fifty employees, and meetings normally consist of 5 people: site manager, HR executive, another 
manager, and 2 employee representatives. In the two stores visited, Bottom-Up meetings were 
meant to occur four times a year but happened only twice. In part, management shaped the space 
for I&C by influencing both the agenda and sequence of meetings. With regard to Lukes’s second 
face of power, management allowed employees to suggest agenda items for the Bottom Up forum, 
but retained ultimate control as to when and what issues made it to the actual meeting agenda. This 
equates to what Sisson (2012) calls ‘decision-based’ consultation. The third face of power was to 
some extent evident in processes used to shape a distinctive corporate culture at RetailCo. The 
revised ‘Bottom Up’ structure combined also with an ideological value for individual employee 
engagement which enabled management to affect change compatible with their own rather than 
employee preferences. For example, reservations about the utility of Bottom Up were expressed by 
line managers: ‘it’s not utilised properly…and it has become negative…a venting exercise’. 
Employees viewed the forum as shallow: ‘something that’s not really taken seriously by 
management’. A non-union representative described a problem with excess heat that had been 
raised at all levels, although management refrained from acting until the Health and Safety 
Inspectorate issued the company with an enforcement notice. ConcreteCo: dual voice in cross-
border jurisdictional space At ConcreteCo there was duality in terms of how processes of social 
formation related to Lukes’s dimensions of power across the two jurisdictions of ROI (unionised) and 
NI/UK (non-union). Importantly, preferences that I&C regulations need to be cognisant of business 
interests were strongly advocated by managers. In part this concurs with Lukes’s first dimension of 
power, in that employers openly dominated space for I&C at workplace level. In NI, management 
simply refused to consult workers and viewed I&C regulations to be at best irksome, at worst an 
intrusion on managers’ right to manage: I think the word ‘consultation’ is a misnomer, it is very 
much communication…. Consultation implies there is a party with information, there is an 
opportunity to give feedback on that 22 information, the feedback is listened to, and as a result 
decisions are taken. That does not happen here (HR Manager, NI). The unilateral decision not to 
consult or involve workers was confirmed by other employees and managers. Some NI employees 
expressed dissatisfaction and wanted more opportunity to ‘have a say and get feedback’. However 
management control circumvented the limited rights employees had regarding consultation. For 
instance, an administration manager was the ‘nominated’ employee representative for the 
European Works Council (EWC). In doing this management could screen out potential issues and 
control the I&C agenda, reflecting the second face of power mobilisation. Similar power utilisation 
was evident in ConcreteCo sites in ROI, although in different ways. Rather than the managerial 
unilateralism evident in NI, unions occupied elements of regulatory space in ROI owing to long-
standing multiunion bargaining and consultation: something the senior HR manager called a ‘good 
system of information and consultation’. In this regard, employees saw the visible role of adversarial 
union bargaining as an effective channel for regulating voice. At the same time, management often 
presented decisions as a fait accompli in collective forums, and thereby restricted power-sharing. In 
short, the second face of power meant that ‘decision-based’ rather than ‘option-based’ consultative 
arrangements emerged in reality. For example: You get the sense that decisions are already made at 
a higher level, then the unions are told. Unions don’t have real influence, say if new machinery or 
work practices come in. There is no real participation. (Union Steward, ROI)  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Integrating multiple evidence and predicting cause and effect is always problematic in sociological 
analysis, and it is not the intention here to offer such predicative causality between multiple 
processes affecting the regulatory space of the I&C Directive. However, there are a number of 
evident patterns in terms of preferences articulated by employment relations actors within and 
across multiple levels of analysis. Such a multi-level and multi-dimensional focus is important in 
helping to understand how social processes of regulatory formation and transposition are mediated 
and manipulated, often using direct but also more subtle forms of power and persuasion. The 
theoretical schematic in Table 1 earlier is reproduced below in Table 3, this time summarising key 
findings for each level, power dimension, and links to I&C practices. In so doing, it illustrates macro-
micro interaction and linkages. The contribution of this multi-level framework is to show how both 
employers and the state in the LME contexts of ROI and UK (NI) have shaped the macro-level 
processes of the I&C Directive to reinforce preferences for voluntarism and employer ‘power over’ 
workplace decisions. The outcome of this - illustrated by linkages to the micro case studies - has 
been to exclude workers from shared decision-making about aspects of workplace governance, that 
the Directive initially intended. The potential for the Directive to act as a spur towards the positive 
uses of ‘power to’ empower workforce decision-making has not materialized. The ICE Regulations 
(2004) in the UK and I&C Act (2006) in Ireland provide an insufficient 24 legislative counterweight to 
shift the power balance in workplace governance from employer dominated ‘power over’ to more 
positive collaborative mutuality. The article suggests that a schematic multi-layered governance 
framework of regulatory space serves as a useful integrated analytical tool (see Table 1) for 
understanding variable impacts of policy formation and transposition of the I&C Directive across 
transnational, national and enterprise levels (see Table 3). In this way, the contribution adds 
something to Lukes’s three faces of power. The concept of power, as Edwards (2006:573) argues, 
remains a ‘necessary element’ when seeking to understand institutions regulating work and it is 
possible to extend Lukes’s analysis of the multiple dimensions of power when examining processes 
of regulatory space. To this end the article addresses some missing pieces in Lukes’s work by 
analysing the nuances of ideological power, the distinction between ‘power over’ as domination and 
‘power to’ get things done for productive ends, empirically connecting the dynamics of how work 
relations shape power relations across macro and micro-levels. The data also exposes inherent 
problems with Lukes’s third face of power given the ambiguity of capturing ideological intent and 
preference-seeking behaviours. In terms of regulatory effects, the evidence pointed to a pattern of 
space occupation that favoured employer over worker interests in two ways. Firstly, direct 
influences on the ‘content’ of the I&C Directive. Secondly, political dialogue that affected the 
‘transposition’ arrangements for national regulation which embedded a sharing of 25 common-
knowledge formation among employers and employer associations promoting the dominance of 
voluntarism and employer choice over voice options. While union actors were not found to be weak 
or powerless per se, they did lack the capacity to establish a more collectivist voice regime serving 
their members’ longterm interests relative to those of employer bodies; especially for lobbying in 
the political sphere. Significantly, unions in the UK and ROI have long been ambivalent and defensive 
about I&C rights, tending to view them as a possible threat to traditional collective bargaining. 
Accordingly unions did not mobilize to affect either content or transposition arrangements of the 
I&C Directive and were unable to challenge a prevailing employer (ideological) orthodoxy. In view of 
this, employers displayed a more effective (efficient) capacity to mobilize ‘power over’ an emerging 
and evolving regulatory space affecting workplace governance powers. Notably, in relation to the 
less observable third power face, a continuous and seemingly omnipresent discourse was 
promulgated by many employers (and policy-makers) that employment regulation should not 
interfere with management’s right to manage as it sees fit. Therefore, the I&C Directive has not 
prompted a new politics of 'common knowledge' formation between employers and unions based 
on robust representative consultation. Rather employers, facilitated by the state, legitimised an 
ideological mind-set that primarily promoted direct employee communications as policy content, 
even though the Directive itself was framed to embed a more collectivist element to workforce 
consultation and shared decision-making. Employer domination over the regulatory space of I&C has 
lubricated an ideological preference for voluntarism across neo-liberal market regimes – in line with 
Lukes’s third ‘face’ of power. In Ireland, especially, US multinational companies and their 
representative associations have exerted considerable ideological power over the content and 
transposition of the I&C Directive. In so doing, employers not only asserted strong lobbying pressure 
on the national government (indeed, there was ideological collusion between the state and big 
business to ensure the I&C Directive did not intrude on managerial prerogative), but also bypassed 
national institutions in influencing European social policy makers directly. The macro context had 
implications for events at micro-level, evident in the case organizations (examples in Table 3). 
Macro-level preferences for laissez faire voluntarism associated with the third face of power, union 
ambivalence, and subsequent minimal transposition of the I&C Directive, meant national regulations 
had little impact in the case organizations in encouraging employers to share decision-making 
powers for productive ends (‘power to’) through new or revised consultation mechanisms; as 
originally intended by the Directive. Rather, employers at micro-level tended to occupy regulatory 
space for I&C governance by utilizing ‘power over’ domination. This was evident by influencing 
workforce expectations and attitudes that legitimised as normal weaker ‘decision-based’ 
information rather than more robust ‘option-based’ consultation arrangements (Sisson, 2012:186-
87). To this end shaping attitudes and worker expectations about what management might deliver 
on joint workplace governance was a power resource for employer occupancy of regulatory space. 
Many local managers assumed as inter-subjective objective knowledge (Culpepper, 2008) that direct 
communications and/or ‘decision-based’ consultation were acceptable and the preferential mode to 
regulate I&C. This meant I&C regulations did not prompt a politics of new common knowledge 
formation around robust representative social dialogue at micro level. Importantly, the multiple 
power dimensions articulated by Lukes were not exclusive but tended to co-exist as resources for 
employer colonization of regulatory space at micro-level. The overlapping faces of power and 
employer capture of regulatory space for voice were more complete in some cases than others. 
There were important differences relating to context-specific factors affecting power to regulate 
I&C; notably the presence of unionized workers and their capacity to contest management 
preferences. The most robust forms of I&C were evident in highly unionized BritCo (NI), and shallow 
in non-union ConcreteCo (NI). In workplaces where unions were not recognized, employer’s 
deployed non-union voice mechanisms to avoid unions. At BritCo (ROI) all three faces of power were 
in play, as union members mobilised collectively to pursue union recognition rights and, thereby, 
opposed the management sponsored non-union forum. While this collective counter-mobilization 
did not mean employees achieved union recognition, they did set certain limits to employer capture 
of regulatory space that unorganized workers would be less able to achieve. In RetailCo, 
management had an ideological agenda to win employee ‘hearts and minds’ by using corporate 
culture by espousing non-union relational values over unionised structures. This did not fully 
translate into dominatorary ‘power over’ within Lukes framework, but instead reflected elements of 
positive ‘power to’ emancipate employees at RetailCo with strong ideological undercurrents of 
paternalism. 28 To conclude, this article makes an important contribution to the processes of 
common knowledge formation as sources of power mobilisation affecting occupation of 
employment regulation. It integrates the concept of ‘regulatory space’ with Lukes ‘faces’ of power to 
provide a schematic integrated macro-micro analytical framework to better understand how 
employment regulation impacts across transnational, national and enterprise levels. The research 
addresses some gaps in Lukes theory by analyzing the nuances of ideological power, the distinction 
between ‘power over’ as domination and ‘power to’. It also shows, however, there are limits to 
Lukes (1974, 2005) categorisation of ideological power at the micro-levels given its ambiguous 
dynamic. By capturing regulatory space for I&C, employers have preserved and even reinforced 
voluntary modes of regulation in the work and employment sphere, while excluding workers from 
shared decision-making (‘power to’), which the Directive initially intended.  
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